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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A PLEA FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGE FROM THE CRIMINAL
By ERNEST C. CARMAN*
N this year of sesquicentennial glorification of the constitution
of the United States, it requires courage to assail any part of
its "bill of rights" as set forth in the first ten amendments adopted
almost simultaneously with the ratification of the constitution
itself. Millions of words have been written about the glory and
grandeur of these amendments and of similar provisions in state
constitutions, which it has been almost universally assumed are
equivalent in American government to earlier and similar grants,
by the sovereigns of Great Britain, with which the authors of our
federal constitution were familiar when they wrote it. But
listen to the voice of Alexander -lamilton telling the people at
that time why no such Bill of Rights was necessary or advisable.
Said he:
"It has been several times trtly remarked, that Bills of Rights
are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,
abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of
rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was magna charta,
obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such
was the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding
princes. Such was the petition of right assented to by Charles the
First, in the beginning of his reign. Such also, was the Declara-
tion of Rights presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince
of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an
act of parliament, called the bill of rights. It is evident, there-
fore, that according to their primitive signification, they have
no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the
power of the people, and executed by their immediate representa-
tives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender noth-
ing; and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular
reservations. 'We the people of the United States, to secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this constitution for the United States of America.' This
is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those
aphorisms, which make the principal figure in several of our state
bills of rights, and which sound much better in a treatise of
ethics, than in a constitution of government."'
*Member Pennsylvania Bar, Minnesota Bar and California Bar.
Formerly assistant attorney general of Minnesota. Member law firm of
Goudge, Robinson and Hughes, Los Angeles.
'The Federalist and Other Constitutional Papers 469, by E. H. Scott,
Editor.
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These views of Alexander Hamilton were supported by two
eminent lawyers, both of whom were appointed justices of the
United States Supreme Court by President Washington as soon
as the constitution was adopted; namely, James Wilson and James
Iredell.
2
This little study leads to the conclusion that experience has
demonstrated there was some merit in the views of Hamilton.
Wilson and Iredell; at least in respect to the influence of the
federal "bill of rights" upon the administration and enforcement
of criminal law in the United States during the past one hundred
and fifty years and now. This article is limited to the development
of such thesis. The opposing argument is too well known for
review here.
Before proceeding now to point out the reasons why certain
provisions of the bill of rights, incorporated for the benefit of
the law-abiding citizen of the United States into the early amend-
ments to the constitution, have become wholly unnecessary for
that purpose and have been perverted into a bill of wrongs for
the benefit of the arch-criminal who now infests this land of the
free and the lawyer-criminal who waxes fat upon his loot, it will
be proper to say that the limitation of federal constitutional priv-
ilege to offenders against the laws of the United States' is not a
corresponding limitation upon the evil resulting therefrom, because
similar provisions in state constitutions will seldom, if ever, be
reformed unless their counterparts be first eliminated from the
national constitution.
And it may be further observed at the outset that these pro-
visions of the constitution of the United States and of the states
are almost never invoked by the small offender-the ordinary citi-
2The Federalist and Other Constitutional Papers 885 et seq., by E. H.
Scott, Editor.
sThe so-called "Bill of Rights," as embraced within the first ten amend-
ments to the federal constitution is, in general, a series of restraints upon
the federal government and not the states. Brown v. Walker, (1896) 161
U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; Brown v. New Jersey, (1899)
175 U. S. 172, 20 Sup. Ct. 77, 44 L. Ed. 119; Bollin v. Nebraska, (1900)
176 U. S. 83, 20 Sup. Ct. 287, 44 L. Ed. 382. On the other hand, the
fourteenth amendment is, by its express terms, a restriction only upon the
powers of the States. Maxwell v. Dow, (1900) 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct.
448, 44 L. Ed. 597; Virginia v. Rives, (1879) 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667.
In the first of the cases cited (Brown v. Walker) it is said: "It is true that
the constitution does not operate upon a witness testifying in the state
courts, since we have held that the first eight amendments are limitations
only upon the powers of Congress and the federal courts, and are not ap-
plicable to the several states, except so far as the fourteenth amendment
may have made them applicable."
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zen who occasionally commits a petty offense under the stress
of some great emotion or runs afoul of some one of the multitude
of laws and ordinances malum prohibitum which plaster the endless
pages of verbotens that are considered necessary for regulation
of the complex modern life of this age. Such small offender yearns
not for the services of the lawyer criminal; nor could afford to
pay his price if so minded. Indeed, the petty offender seldom has
any desire to conceal the evidence of his guilt; he becomes no
menace to society; and his little punishment presents no consti-
tutional difficulties. The discussion now to follow is to be taken,
therefore, as limited always to the real criminals-murderers,
robbers, kidnapers, rapists and perverts, thieves, racketeers of
high and low station, and all their ilk and kind-mortal enemies of
organized government and society entitled to no consideration
whatsoever but, nevertheless, coddled and encouraged to continue
their depredations under their constitutional privilege of always
going scotfree if they merely take the precaution to conceal the
evidence of their guilt and stand mute in the courts of law when
accused of it.
The offensive and archaic provisions of the federal constitution
to which reference is here made are found in the fourth, fifth
and fourteenth amendments thereto, and may be summarized gen-
erally as extending to persons accused of crime (a) the privi-
lege of keeping concealed all their papers and effects from which
their guilt or innocence might be easily and directly ascertained,
unless some person on oath is able particularly to describe such
papers and effects and the place where the same are concealed,"
so as to procure a search warrant therefor; (b) the privilege of
standing mute and silent in court, 5 wholly immune from so much
as a single question directly tending to establish their guilt or
innocence about which they know more thany any other person
in the world, and the further privilege of exemption from any
second trial after acquittal once of the offense charged," no matter
what subsequent evidence of their guilt may come to light. Unless
the public prosecutor convicts the accused in spite of these con-
stitutional barriers, and without infringement thereof, the latter
is denied "due process of law" which is guaranteed in the federal
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To anyone who looks into the historical origin of these pro-
visions, their absurdity in the fundamental law of the land in
this day and age becomes at once apparent. For they originated
in the necessity for protection of political and religious offenders,
of which there are none in the United States now.7 The provoca-
tion of the patriots, if such they were, who called the loudest for
the incorporation of these provisions into the early amendments
to the constitution was none other than the notorious Court of
Star-Chamber" established by tyrants who occupied the throne of
Great Britain some three hundred years ago, and earlier, into
which so-called court consisting of the king's council packed with
his judicial yes-men, any person who had incurred the dislike
of the king by opposing his tyranny, or otherwise, could be haled
for a trial without a jury, or tried without being present at all
upon a mere written statement that had been extorted from him
containing covert admissions of guilt, and in which alleged court
the prisoner if present could be tortured until he "confessed,"
and then immediately subjected to any penalty short of death-
the penalty usually including bodily mutilation of the victim
satisfactory to the king.
This court was a particular abomination to the Puritans at
the time they migrated for settlement on the savage continent of
North America prior to abolition of the court by the Long Parlia-
ment in the year 1641; and it had been by no means forgotten
when the constitution of the United States was written in 1787,
and the bill of rights appended shortly after the constitution was
7The federal constitution by the first amendment, and the constitutions
of the several states by like provisions, have expressly granted political
and religious liberty to every inhabitant; thereby automatically making it
impossible for any public offense to be committed in the bona fide exer-
cise of the privileges or rights so constitutionally secured. Hence, there
are not and cannot now be, within the United States, any political or reli-
gious offenders requiring the protection of the fourth, fifth or fourteenth
amendment of the constitution of the United States, or of like provisions in
state constitutions, to insure the exercise of their political or religious free-
dom.8See sketch "Star Chamber" in Encyclopedia Britannica and authorities
there cited. For a more uncomplimentary sketch see "Star Chamber," 21,
New International Encyclopedia 456, (1920) where it is said:
"As a criminal court, it could inflict any punishment short of death,
and had cognizance of all cases that might be brought under the head of
contempt of the royal authority. Offenders against the royal proclamations,
or religious laws were there condemned . . . forced confessions, pressure,
torture prevailed. Admissions of the most immaterial facts were con-
strued into confessions; and fine, imprisonment and mutilation were inflicted
on a mere oral proceeding, without hearing the accused, by a court con-
sisting of the immediate representatives of prerogative."-Citing Schofield,
Study of the Court of Star Chamber.
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adopted. Hence, these constitutional barriers to compelling a man
to testify against himself, or to yield up his private papers, or
to be tried a second time for the same offense or at all by other
than a jury of his peers, and finally the prohibition of cruel and
inhuman punishment after conviction.
That there could be no such thing as a star-chamber court,
or any similar tribunal, established or operated in these United
States now, or at any predictable future time, is too self-evident
to merit discussion. And if plain, ordinary, twentieth-century
common sense be substituted for political claptrap, it is equally
clear that no law abiding person within the four corners of the
Union can be erroneously convicted of a crime because he is com-
pelled to disclose what, if any, evidence he controls in respect to
it-whether documentary or otherwise.
Let the most ardent advocate of constitutional privilege to the
criminal point out a single case in all the annals of American
jurisprudence where an innocent man has been, or could have
been, convicted because compelled to answer questions about the
crime of which he was accused. No such case can be found. And
it is probable that not a single case can be found where anyone
mistakenly accused of crime has failed voluntarily to take the
witness stand in his own defense. Indeed, it is utterly impossible
for an innocent person to testify against himself, since the truth
is always in his favor; unless, perchance, he is motivated by a
deliberate and insane desire to be wrongfully convicted, in which
rare case, if any, he could as well take the witness stand voluntarily
and lie himself into prison or an insane asylum.
Nor is there any more substantial danger of an innocent person
being convicted of any crime because he is compelled to give up
papers, however private, which may throw some light upon such
crime. And if his desire to withhold his papers be for the con-
cealment of some other crime of which he is not yet accused,
even though he be innocent and erroneously accused of the crime
under investigation, that certainly affords no reason in law or logic
for immunizing him from punishment for the crime of which he
is guilty. For as a criminal, he should be entitled to no privileges
-constitutional or otherwise-which absolve him from account-
ability for his wrong doing. And herein is the crux of the whole
breakdown and woeful inefficiency of criminal law enforcement in
the United States. The courts have forgotten that it was the
innocent, law abiding citizen these constitutional provisions were
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designed to protect-not the guilty criminal. The law reports
reek with judicial eloquence about fair trials and the rights of the
criminal. But there never was a fair crime committed; nor a
criminal entitled to any rights whatsoever arising from any crime
committed by him, although he may still claim the benefit of the
wrongs inherent in this archaic constitutional privilege of con-
cealing the evidence of his guilt-of stabbing in the back the very
government under which he claims such privilege.
But this privilege is so well established as to bring forth from
the Supreme Court of the United States the expression of
grandiose sentiments about the criminal-not the innocent victim,
but the criminal whose constitutional privilege of concealing the
evidence of his guilt had been invaded by the public prosecutor for
an outraged government-in this high sounding language ad-
dressed, apparently, to all the courts in the United States :9
9Weeks v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 392, 34 Sup. Ct. 419, 58
L. Ed. 652. In this case, it appeared that a United States Marshal, with-
out any search warrant or other process, had broken into the home of de-
fendant and taken therefrom certain documentary evidence which he de-
livered to the public prosecutor and he, in turn, used it to prove (and it did
prove) the guilt of defendant, who was convicted accordingly of the crime
charged in the indictment. The trial court had refused to order the papers
returned to defendant before trial, and had admitted same in evidence over
the objection of defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
upon the sole ground that, in holding the documents and admitting them in
evidence, the trial court had committed "prejudicial error." But the
Supreme Court would have sustained the conviction if a private person,
instead of the United States Marshal, had broken into the defendant's house,
stolen the same papers, and delivered them to the same prosecutor, and he
had used them in the same way to convict defendant. Burdeau v. McDowell,
(1921) 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048. And this, notwith-
standing the fact that there was available to defendant in the Weeks case
the same legal remedies against the United States Marshal that would have
been available against any private person who committed the same offense
(56 Corpus Juris, page 1254, sec. 194 and authorities there cited), except,
possibly, as to criminal intent which presumably the United States Marshal
did not have.
In the Weeks Case, if the public prosecutor had returned the papers to
the defendant before trial and then, either by subpoena duces tecum or by
search warrant duly issued, had subsequently brought the same papers
back into court and used them as evidence against the defendant, the
conviction nevertheless would have been reversed by the Supreme Court.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, (1919) 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct.
182, 64 L. Ed. 319. If there had been no previous violation of defendant's
constitutional privileges, nevertheless he could not have been compelled to
produce the documents in question any more than to testify against himself.
Boyd v. United States, (1886) 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746.
But, if the defendant had been a law abiding citizen neither guilty nor
accused of any crime, he could have been compelled to produce the same
papers in court and testify as to their contents in any civil action wherein
the same were relevant, even though in doing so he was compelled to dis-
close his own valuable business secrets and otherwise suffer pecuniary loss.
70 Corpus Juris, page 53, sec. 41, and authorities there cited. The con-
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"The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the federal constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts."
And the criminal in that case, as in many another, was turned
loose to prey further upon the innocent whom the constitution
was made to protect merely because the evidence of his guilt had
been unconstitutionally procured. But why? Was he any less
guilty than he would have been if the papers unlawfully seized
had been inadvertently lost by him and found by the public
prosecutor? Why the solicitude of the court for the criminal
instead of his victim? If a public prosecutor has done wrong,
what is the proper and common sense remedy-to remove him
from office or otherwise punish him, or to turn the convicted
criminal loose so as to humiliate the prosecutor? Could the
sophistry of any intelligent human being in all the world except a
judge rise to such heights as to answer this query, in this day and
age, by saying that the right course is to turn loose the convicted
and guilty criminal? There is nothing in the language of the
constitution requiring any such thing to be done. On the con-
trary, the constitution is entirely silent as to the penalty which
shall be imposed upon a public prosecutor, or any other person,
for violation of its prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures without a search warrant supported by oath "particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized"-nowadays an obvious impossibility, because no danger-
ous criminal is either so stupid or careless as to permit law
enforcement officers to see his papers or other evidence of his
guilt, or the place of concealment thereof, so as to be able to
describe the same under oath and with particularity.
What else could more conclusively demonstrate the necessity
for a constitutional amendment framed to protect the innocent
victim instead of the guilty criminal? For in a well ordered
society, to speak of the rights of a criminal appertaining to his
crime is a perversion of both language and logic. There can be
no such thing. A criminal has no such rights under any govern-
ment worthy of respect until he has first paid the penalty for his
stitutional privilege of refusing to testify or disclose documentary evidence
is strictly limited to criminals, since it could not otherwise be incriminaling.
Counselman v. Hithcock, (1892) 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed.
1110.
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crime. Until then he is entitled to less consideration than a rattle-
snake which warns before it strikes, has no confederates (lawyer-
criminals or others), lives in no luxury by the sweat of another's
brov, and has never been taught the difference between right and
wrong. Not a reptile, but only a fiend in human form can sneak
upon his victim in the dark, stab him in the back, rob, plunder,
burn, rape defenseless women, and kidnap and murder helpless
and innocent children. And it is only such a fiend who is given
the constitutional privilege of concealing the evidence of his
guilt. No, that is not quite correct. The same constitutional
privilege is also extended to the malefactor of great wealth who
lives and moves in an atmosphere of apparent respectability. All
the criminals of both these types on the opposite ends of society
are accorded the same anxious solicitude of the courts in respect
to the matter here under discussion.
The very thought of being compelled to disclose his secret
communications and answer under oath in the criminal courts, or
without immunity before a grand jury, concerning the mysterious
and uniform maintenance of exorbitant prices by him and his
pretended competitors in business, would make the blood run
cold in the veins of many a pillar of ostentatious respectability in
the world of finance and commerce.
With no less disfavor and alarm would the common thug and
murderer on the other end of the social ladder view the prospect
of being compelled to tell what he knows about the crime of which
he is accused.
Constitutional liberty-meaning the privilege of concealing
evidence of guilt-has become the common shibboleth of the
criminal of high and low estate seeking the doorway to immunity
from punishment for the injuries which both alike inflict upon
the people of the nation. Remove it; make criminal trials a
common sense investigation of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, about which he knows the most and naturally should be
the first to testify and disclose his knowledge; abolish all rules
of evidence that are rooted in such constitutional privilege of the
criminal-including the illogical presumption that the accused is
innocent until proven guilty, which is equivalent to presuming that
the grand jurors who indicted him were either stupid or corrupt
-and the crime problem will cease to be such.
A tax collector or assessor, state or federal, may always pre-
sume the worst against the taxpayer until he proves the contrary.10
'
0 Typical provisions of this nature are to be found in subdivision (c)
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The taxpayer does not have the constitutional protection which
the criminal enjoys. There should be no presumption that one
accused of crime is or is not guilty in this day and age; and
the accused should be the first to testify. A litigant may be cross-
examined and compelled to disclose his papers in a civil suit
involving property rights;" and a bankrupt (whether voluntary
or involuntary) may be subjected to the most searching cross-
examination in respect to the conditions which brought about his
insolvency and the disposal of his property." Why, then, such
tender solicitude for the self same person, or any other, when
accused of crime? Why special privilege or exemption from
accountability in the matter of crime which wrongs all the people,
but a different rule in the matter of mere property rights which
affect only the litigants?
Abolition of special constitutional privilege to the criminal,
beginning with the federal constitution, is the primary pre-
requisite to any effectual reform of criminal trial court procedure
or efficient, common sense enforcement of criminal law.
There is no longer any necessity for a choice between the
imaginary evil of a too ardent prosecutor and the real evil of
constitutional privilege to the criminal. Let this illogical handi-
cap of the prosecutor be removed and he will cease to be the
subject of such criticism. And millions upon millions of tax-
payers' dollars will be saved which are now being spent in the
investigation and proof of circumstantial facts for no purpose
other than the overcoming of such handicap. With universal
education and newspaper and radio publicity what it now is, there
can be no such thing as a secret trial or an innocent person
being misled into admissions of guilt upon his examination under
of sec. 411 and in sec. 568 United States Code, and others are cited in 61
Corpus Juris, 573 (Section 702). All are based upon the principle that the
taxpayer knows more about his property than' the taxing authorities,
hence he can easily disprove the presumptions against himself if he sees fit
to do so. The same reasoning applies with even greater force to one accused
of crime who knows to a certainty whether he is guilty or innocent and,
if innocent, can and always does take the witness stand in his own behalf.
It is only the guilty who claim the constitutional privilege of not testifying;
hence the constitution is perverted into a shield for the guilty at the expense
of the law-abiding citizen who is the innocent victim.
"As typical of many others, see sec. 2055, California, Code of Civil
Procedure and sec. 277 of Title 28, United States Code, 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
277, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 277, being sec. 119 of the Federal
Judicial Code.
'
2Section 25 of the National Bankruptcy Act. Because of the constitu-
tional provisions above discussed, it is provided that no testimony given by
the bankrupt shall be used against him in any criminal proceeding. Hence,
if he is a criminal he is privileged; otherwise noL
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oath in open court. And, as already pointed out, no person
accused of crime can be a witness against himself unless he is
guilty.
The infringement of privacy in respect to personal papers and
effects may be the subject of some abuse; but this can be cured
by statutory safeguards much better than by universal privacy as
a constitutional right, including the right of the criminal to
suppress evidence of his own guilt. There is neither logic nor
practical experience to support a more extreme right of privacy
in the criminal, or person accused of crime, than is accorded the
law abiding citizen in civil litigation; and the latter can be ade-
quately protected by legislation and by the courts without express
and unbending constitutional provisions such as the language of
the fourth amendment prohibiting any search warrant unless
supported by oath "particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." A man's house may still
be his castle without a criminal's house continuing to be his
fortress equipped with constitutional guns holding at bay the
entire might of the United States Government itself unless some-
one can be found to describe under oath the contents of such
fortress before anyone has been permitted to see it.
As one consequence of such constitutional reform, if effected,
no longer will the ordinary citizen behold, to his amazement and
bewilderment, a criminal court being conducted, not by the judge,
but by the criminal at the bar and his accessory-after-the-fact
immunized from personal accountability and glorified with a
license to practice law.
The fourth amendment to the constitution should now be
further amended to read as follows:
"1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; but this shall not be so construed
as to permit any person indicted or otherwise lawfully charged
with crime in any court of the United States or of any of the
states to withhold or conceal any evidence relating thereto or
escape punishment if convicted by reason thereof.
"2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
The fifth amendment to the constitution should also be now
amended to read as follows:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime in any court of the United States unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
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in the land or naval forces, or in the army or militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger; nor be deprived by
the United States of life, liberty or property without due process
under the laws thereof; nor shall private property be taken by tile
United States for public use without just compensation."
And as a corollary thereto, notwithstanding declarations by
the supreme court that the foregoing amendments are applicable
only as restraints upon the United States while the fourteenth
amendment is operative only against the states, section 1 of the
latter should be also amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
under the laws of such State; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of such laws."
With such amendmnents in force, criminal appeals to the
United States Supreme Court would be practically limited to cases
arising in the lower federal court where the beneficent example
of trials no longer hampered by constitutional privilege to crim-
inals would soon bring about like reforms in the several
States; and the power of the states to enforce their own criminal
laws without interference by the United States supreme court,
as well as all other laws limited in their operation and effect to
the confines of the respective States, would be restored subject only
to the condition that the same must operate and be enforced with-
out discrimination among the citizens of the United States.
The fourteenth amendment was never intended to have any
greater effect; and the clauses in the fourth and fifth amendments
here suggested for elimination were originally inserted therein
for the protection of political and religious offenders of a species
long since extinct. They now protect only the big-time criminals.
